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In recent years, in response to ever-increasing budget deficits, numerous
politicians and commentators have argued that Congress should give the
President greater powers to reduce federal spending through a variety of means,
including the impoundment of funds.1 While such arguments may initially seem
attractive to those who wish to control or eliminate the deficit, they also have
significant implications for the principle of separation of powers and the
constitutional requirement that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."2 In light of the continu-
ing pressures to respond to the budget deficit, proposals for expanded executive
impoundment are likely to continue. This Note examines the current state of
the law relating to the presidential impoundment of funds and will argue that
Congress should resist proposals to expand presidential impoundment powers.
Instead, Congress should create additional tools to insure that the President does
not unconstitutionally impound funds in the future.
Professor Kate Stith argues that there are two governing principles relating
to the federal budget: (1) the Principle of the Public Fisc, which "assert[s] that
all monies received from whatever source by any part of the government are
public funds"3 and (2) the Principle of Appropriations Control, which "prohib-
it[s] expenditure of any public money without legislative authorization."4
There is also arguably a third principle, which is the inverse of the Principle
of Appropriations Control. This principle, which this Note calls the Principle
of Appropriation Expenditure, requires the expenditure of all money that is
1. For the purposes of this Note, impoundment is defined as "[a]ny action or inaction by an officer
or employee of the United States Government that precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget
authority provided by Congress." GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 63 (3d ed. 1981).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
3. Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE LJ. 1343, 1345 (1988).
4. Id.
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appropriated by the Congress, unless Congress authorizes the executive to spend
less than the full amount appropriated. In the language of the budget, this
principle prohibits the executive branch from impounding funds unless autho-
rized to do so by Congress. With limited exceptions,5 the Principle of Appro-
priation Expenditure has been broadly accepted by those writing about im-
poundment and enforced by the courts.
6
Through the years, Congress has realized that, in order to execute the laws
most effectively, the President must be given some discretion in choosing
whether to spend all the money that has been appropriated. The President has
required a certain amount of flexibility to better (1) respond to changes in
circumstances (such as the end of a war) and (2) realize operating efficiencies
by fulfilling the goals that Congress had in mind when it made the appropria-
tion while, at the same time, spending less money than Congress appropriated.
Congress has traditionally given such flexibility to the executive branch
through two mechanisms. First, Congress has included specific language in
particular authorization or appropriation bills which explicitly provides that the
executive branch does not have to spend the full amount of the appropriation.
Second, Congress has enacted a series of laws which establish a general frame-
work for determining the circumstances and the procedures under which the
President may impound funds. 7 The two primary acts which have established
5. See, e.g., Harner, Presidential Power to Impound Appropriationsfor Defense and Foreign Relations,
5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 131 (1982) (arguing that, under certain circumstances, President may impound
appropriations for foreign relations). Several commentators and Presidents have argued that there is a
constitutional exception to the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure in the area of foreign relations. This
exception is said to derive from the Commander-in-Chief clause, U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, and the President's
broad authority in overseeing foreign affairs. Courts have not yet addressed this issue.
In addition, there may be other areas where the President has an inherent Article II power to reduce
expenditures. For example, the President arguably may choose to spend less than the full amount appropriat-
ed for White House staff. Or the President could theoretically reduce court and prison expenditures by a
widespread exercise of his pardon power. Neither of these issues apprear to have been litigated.
6. From 1973 to 1975, in response to the impoundments of the Nixon Administration, there were over
30 law journal articles and notes addressing this issue. The articles were virtually unanimous in their view
that, with the exception of the situations where Congress had explicitly granted the President the power to
impound or where a foreign relations exception might exist, see supra note 5, impoundments are unconstitu-
tional under the doctrine of separation of powers. More specifically, they argued that impoundments are
unconstitutional based upon both the Article I provision that all appropriations are to be made by law and
the Article II provision that the President shall "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." See Abascal
& Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO.
LU. 1549 (1974); Abascal & Kramer, Presidential ImpoundmentPart II: Judicial andLegislative Responses,
63 GEO. L.. 149 (1974); Levinson & Mills, Budget Reform and Impoundment Control, 27 VAND. L REV.
615 (1974); Mills & Munselle, Unimpoundment: Politics and the Courts in the Release of Impounded Funds,
24 EMORY L.L 313 (1975); Note, Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power,
82 YALE L.L 1636 (1973).
7. Impoundments can be categorized in several ways. Expenditure of appropriations may be deferred
(thus requiring only half-year funding, for example) or not undertaken at all. Several commentators have
distinguished between routine impoundments, for efficiency reasons, and policy impoundments, forprogram-
matic reasons. See generally Fisher, Congressional Budget Reform: The First Twvo Years, 14 HARV. L ON
LEGIS. 413, 448-49 (1977) (discussing various categories of impoundment).
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this general framework are the Anti-Deficiency Acte and the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 (ICA). 9
This Note examines the enforcement of the Principle of Appropriation
Expenditure. 10 Part I provides a brief history of impoundment control, as
divided into two periods: prior to enactment of the ICA and subsequent to
enactment of the ICA. Part II identifies two issues relating to the present and
future effectiveness of the ICA as a tool for enforcing the Principle of Appro-
priation Expenditure: first, who has standing to sue under the ICA and second,
current proposals in Congress to amend the ICA, which would have the effect
of reducing congressional control over presidential impoundments. Part III
evaluates the issues relating to standing and proposes amendments to the ICA
to provide for better enforcement of the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure.
I. A BRiEF HISTORY OF IMPOUNDMENT
A. Impoundment Prior to the ICA
Presidential impoundment dates back at least to the administration of
Thomas Jefferson." In the years from the Jefferson Administration until the
Nixon Administration, presidential impoundments were generally dealt with in
one of two ways. First, Congress sometimes acquiesced in the impoundment.
It makes little sense for Congress to challenge the executive when money is
impounded because the original purpose of the appropriation no longer exists
or because efficiencies can be achieved.
The second response was a political one directed at the President, either in
the form of pressure from Congress or direct pressure from frustrated potential
recipients of impounded funds. Congressional leaders and presidential staff
would negotiate (either openly or behind the scenes) to reach an accommoda-
tion which would allow for a level or type of impoundment that was acceptable
8. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42, 1349-51, 1511-57 (1988).
9. 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-88 (1988).
10. This Note focusses only on impoundments that are large or important enough to be noticed by
Congress or those parties, such as local governments or interest groups, who had expected to receive the
impounded funds.
As several commentators have pointed out, there appear to be numerous small-scale impoundments
that occur within agency bureaucracies on a routine basis. Such impoundments are not reported to Congress,
as required by the ICA, and are apparently not reported to the Office of Management and Budget either.
It is such hidden impoundments, among other factors, that have led one commentator to call budget
administration the "dark continent" of the federal budget process. Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution:
the Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 643 (1988) (citing Oversight on the Impound-
ment Control Process: Hearing Before the Task Force on Enforcement, Credit, and Multiyear Budgeting
of the House Comm. on the Budget, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1982) (statement of Professor Allen Schick)).
11. In 1803, Congress appropriated $50,000 for gunboats for use along the Mississippi River to protect
against attacks from the French. The subsequent Louisiana Purchase made acquisition of the gunboats
unnecessary, so Jefferson notified the Congress that he did not intend to spend the funds appropriated for
that purpose. Not surprisingly, Congress did not object. L. FISHER, PRESIMMTAL SPENDING POWER 150
(1975).
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to Congress. Furthermore, at times the President would cave in to pressure from
states, local units of government or special interest groups who might suffer
if funds were impounded."
The Nixon Administration changed the unwritten rules of the impoundment
battle. First, President Nixon impounded in quantities far greater than had oc-
curred during any previous administration. Second, Nixon defined policy im-
poundments very broadly, so that, for example, the need to control inflation was
a sufficient reason to curb federal spending on a selective basis. 3 Finally,
Nixon claimed a constitutional basis for all impoundments, including both
routine and policy impoundments.14
Whereas under previous administrations Congress had been able to work
out a political solution to conflicts with the President over impoundments,
Congress was frequently unable to reach agreements with the Nixon Adminis-
tration.' 5 When the political response was no longer effective, a series of
lawsuits arose, brought by frustrated potential recipients of funds that had been
impounded by the President. Prior to passage of the ICA, courts generally found
in favor of the frustrated potential recipient of funds. 6
The Supreme Court has only once ruled in a case where a potential recipient
of funds wanted to force the release of impounded funds. In Train v. City of
New York,' 7 the Court analyzed the issue as one of interpretation of the autho-
rization statute.' The case involved an order from the President to the Admin-
12. See generally Mills & Munselle, supra note 6, at 315-22 (discussing various forms of political
pressure from potential recipients of funds).
13. See generally L. FISHER, supra note 11, at 175-97 (detailed discussion of Nixon's impoundment
record).
14. Nixon cited the "executive power" clause. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. See generally, Note, Impound-
ment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1513-16 (1973) (discussing Nixon's constitutional justifications
for impoundment).
15. See L. FISHER, supra note 11, at 175-77 (discussing the inability of Congress to respond to Nixon
impoundments which were "unprecedented in their scope and severity").
16. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n of Mo. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); Guadamuz v.
Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1973); Oklahoma v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Okla. 1973);
Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va. 1973).
The courts followed a two-step logic in disallowing executive impoundments. First the courts made
the constitutional argument that, based upon the principle of separation of powers and the duties of the
legislative and executive branches, as embodied in the first two articles of the Constitution, the President
could not impound funds without Congressional approval. Next, the courts interpreted the statute to
determine legislative intent. If Congress intended to give impoundment power to the President, then such
impoundments were constitutional and legal. Otherwise, they were not. This two step argument applies in
the post-ICA period as well. After the ICA, Congress may give the President authority to impound either
through a particular authorization or under the procedures established by the ICA. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 28-36.
17. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
18. Although this case was decided seven months after passage of the ICA, the Court ruled that the
ICA did not apply here, because the first section of the ICA provided that, "Nothing contained in this Act,
or in any amendments made by this Act, shall be construed as ... (3) affecting in any way the claims or
defenses of any party to litigation concerning any impoundment." 2 U.S.C. § 681 (1988). The Court
concluded that "[t]he Act would thus not appear to affect cases such as this one, pending on the date of
enactment of the statute.... [No [other] issues as to the reach or coverage of the Impoundment Act [sic]
are before us." Train, 420 U.S. at 42 n.8.
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istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stipulating that each
state receive less than the full amount that had been authorized under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.19 The Court ruled
that the Act did not allow such a reduction in the allotments to the States,
basing its conclusion upon its interpretation of the legislative intent in passing
the Act.2
While the executive did not frame its argument in constitutional separation
of powers terms, and the Court therefore did not base its ruling on such an
argument, the issue is clearly lurking in the background, both in this case and
in the general question of impoundment control. If the President had a constitu-
tional power to impound funds without congressional approval, then legislative
intent regarding the amount of the allotment would be irrelevant. The Court
implied as much when it wrote: "The issue in this case is the extent of the
authority of the Executive to control expenditures for a program that Congress
has funded in the manner and under the circumstances present here."'"
A more complete discussion of the various statutory issues relating to im-
poundment prior to the passage of the ICA can be found in State Highway
Commission of Missouri v. Volpe. 2 In this case, the President sought to with-
hold highway trust funds in order to fight inflation and the State Highway
Commission of Missouri sued, arguing that the authorization statute did not
allow such withholdings. The court explicitly held that "[r]esolution of the issue
before us does not involve analysis of the Executive's constitutional powers"
because the government did not make the argument here that there was a
constitutional right to impound funds.13 The court then went on to rule that
the issue was strictly one of statutory construction and that Congress had indeed
mandated the spending of the funds.'
The court next ruled on the applicability of the Anti-Deficiency Act.25 This
law, which was later amended by the ICA, allowed the executive branch to
establish reserves, for the purpose of withholding funds, to "provide for contin-
gencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible by or through
changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other developments
subsequent to the date on which such appropriation was made available."'
The court ruled that the legislative history made clear that this language would
not allow the impoundment of funds for policy reasons. The court found that
19. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Star. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252-68 (1988)).
20. Train, 420 U.S. at 41-49.
21. Id. at 39 n.2.
22. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 1106.
24. Id. at 1107.
25. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988)).
26. Volpe, 479 F.2d at 1118 (citing the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(c) (current version at
31 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988)).
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the executive branch could not impound funds so as to jeopardize the objectives
of the appropriation statute.
The Volpe court thus noted the existence of three possible justifications for
impoundment. The first was a constitutional justification, on which the court
did not rule. The second justification was based on an interpretation of the
particular authorization statute. The court rejected this justification in light of
legislative history and statutory construction. The court also rejected the third
justification, which was based upon the Anti-Deficiency Act.
While neither the Supreme Court nor appellate courts have ruled on consti-
tutional separation of powers justifications for executive impoundment, various
district courts have done so.' Each court has found executive impoundment,
without the approval of Congress, to be unconstitutional.
In sum, during the pre-ICA period, courts examined three types ofjustifica-
tions for executive impoundment and found each unconvincing. Courts rejected
justifications based upon (1) implied constitutional powers, (2) the Anti-Defi-
ciency Act and (3) provisions of specific budget authorization statutes.
B. Impoundment After the ICA
The ICA, which was enacted as Title X of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974,1 established a new set of tools which
Congress could use to monitor and, if necessary, prevent presidential impound-
ments. This section discusses the ICA and how the three branches of govern-
ment have interpreted and responded to its provisions.
27. Lousiana ex rel. Guste v. Brinegar, 388 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1975), for example, raised the same
highway funds issue as had Volpe. After determining that neither the authorization act nor the Anti-
Deficiency Act allowed the impoundments, the court turned to the government's final argument that "the
President's express or implied constitutional powers justify holding back authorized funds." Id. at 1324.
The court noted first that this argument had been rejected by numerous other district courts. Id. at 1324-
25 & n.13 (citing Guadamuz v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233, 1243-44 (D.D.C. 1973); Local 2677, Am. Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60,77 (D.D.C. 1973)). The court then argued that "the vesting
of '[t]he executive Power' in the President and the requirement to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed' are hardly grants of legislative power." Id. at 1325 (footnotes omitted). As general support for
this argument, the court cited Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524,613 (1838) ("To
contend that the obligation imposed on the president to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power
to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution and entirely impermissible.'), and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952) ("The Constitution [does] not subject
[the] lawmaking power of Congress to presidential... supervision or control.... The Founders of this
Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times."), in arguing that
the President has no power to refuse to execute the laws or make new laws without the consent of the
legislature.
The court next considered the executive branch's argument that it was "uniquely suited to render timely,
swift and integrated fiscal and economic decisions-in contrast to the cumbersome committee, hearing and
floor debate process through which Congress works its will." Louisiana ex rel. Guste, 388 F. Supp. at 1325.
The court responded by noting that "[n]owhere does our Constitution extol the virtue of efficiency and
nowhere does it command that all our laws be fiscally wise." Id. at 1325 (quoting Guadamuz v. Ash, 368
F. Supp. 1233, 1243 (D.D.C. 1973)).




1. Provisions of the ICA as Enacted in 1974
The ICA created two categories of impoundment and established the condi-
tions under which the President could undertake each category of impound-
ment.29 In addition, the ICA created two roles for the Comptroller General.
First, the Comptroller General is to submit a report in cases where the executive
branch has (a) impounded funds without submitting a special message to the
Congress or (b) incorrectly classified a proposed impoundment (i.e., calling a
proposed rescission a deferral or vice versa).30 Second, the Comptroller Gener-
al is empowered to bring suit against the executive branch to force the release
of impounded funds in cases where the executive branch had illegally impound-
ed funds by not following the procedures and restrictions on such activity as
embodied in the ICA.
31
2. The ICA After Codification of New Haven
No impoundment case has reached the Supreme Court since Train and thus
the Court has not ruled on any aspect of the ICA. However, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has twice ruled on issues relating
to the ICA.
29. The first category is "rescission," whereby the President, with the approval of Congress, can cancel
budget authority previously provided by Congress. In order to rescind funds, the President must transmit
a special message to Congress outlining the reasons for, and the impact of, the rescission. If Congress
wishes, it may then respond to the special message by passing a rescission bill, which rescinds, in whole
or in part, the budget authority. If Congress does not so act within forty-five calendar days of the message,
then the President must release the funds. 2 U.S.C. § 683 (1988).
The second category of impoundment created by the ICA is "deferral," which is defined in the ICA
as:
(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of budget authority (whether by
establishing reserves or otherwise) provided for projects or activities; or
(B) any other type of Executive action or inaction which effectively precludes the obligation or
expenditure of budget authority, including authority to obligate by contract in advance of
appropriations as specifically authorized by law.
2 U.S.C. § 682 (1988).
The 1974 version of the ICA contained deferral reporting requirements similar to those for proposed
rescissions, but allowed unilateral executive deferrals unless either house of Congress passed an impound-
ment resolution disapproving such deferral. Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 334 (1974) (amended
1987). This provision was later found unconstitutional in City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d
900 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See infra notes 32-36 and accompany-
ing text.
30. 2 U.S.C. § 686 (1988).
31. 2 U.S.C. § 687 (1988). While the ICA did not explicitly require the Comptroller General to obtain
the approval of Congress before bringing suit, it did stipulate that:
[n]o civil action shall be brought by the Comptroller General under this [Act] until the expiration
of 25 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress following the date on which an
explanatory statement by the Comptroller General of the circumstances giving rise to the action
contemplated has been filed with the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate.
Id. This language clearly implies that the Comptroller General is to consult with the Congressional leadership
before bringing a suit.
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In City of New Haven v. United States,32 the court found the deferral
section of the ICA to be unconstitutional, under INS v. Chadha,33 because it
contained a legislative veto. The New Haven court found the entire section of
the ICA dealing with deferrals to be invalid, because the unconstitutional
legislative veto section of the Act was not severable from the rest of the
deferral section23 As a result of the court's ruling, the ICA applied only to
rescissions, or permanent impoundments. The court ruled that deferrals would
be governed by the Anti-Deficiency Act.35 Within nine months Congress
amended the ICA to codify the New Haven court's ruling.3 6
3. Standing to Sue Under the ICA
No court has explicitly held that the ICA creates a private right of action,
although one appellate court has permitted a private suit under the ICA. In West
Central Missouri Rural Development Corp. v. Donovan,37 appellants chal-
lenged a presidential deferral under the ICA. The court ruled against the
appellants on the question of whether the deferral was valid under the ICA but,
significantly, did not rule that they lacked standing.3 8
However, two district courts have ruled that the ICA does not create a
private right of action. In Public Citizen v. Stockman,39 the plaintiffs, who
represented private potential recipients of funds, claimed that impoundments
that the President had classified under the ICA as deferrals were, in fact,
rescissions. The Comptroller General did not report any violation of the ICA
to Congress and indicated no intention of bringing suit in federal court to force
release of impounded funds.
The court, ruling that the ICA had created no private right of action, denied
the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. It ruled that, based upon
32. 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In addition to New Haven, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia also decided West Central MissouriRural Development Corp. v. Donovan, 659 F.2d 199 (D.C.
Cir. 198 1). The court held that the President's deferral was valid under the provisions of the ICA. See infra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text. No other appellate court appears to have ruled on issues relating to
the ICA.
33. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
34. City of New Haven, 809 F.2d at 902.
35. Id. at 909.
36. The new section on deferrals contained the same executive reporting requirements for deferrals,
but provided that:
Deferrals shall be permissible only-
(1) to provide for contingencies;
(2) to achieve savings made possible by or through changes in requirements or greater
efficiency of operations; or
(3) as specifically provided by law.
No officer or employee of the United States may defer any budget authority for any other purpose.
Pub. L No. 100-119, § 206, 101 Stat. 785 (1987).
37. 659 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
38. The court did not address the issue of standing at all in its opinion.
39. 528 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1981).
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legislative history and statutory construction, only the Comptroller General
could bring a suit under the ICA contending that an impoundment was improp-
erly classified.4
While courts have held that frustrated potential recipients of funds (includ-
ing individuals and public interest groups, as well as state and local govern-
ments) may not bring suit to force the release of impounded funds under the
ICA, no such case has been decided in a suit brought by the one party specifi-
cally permitted, by the terms of the ICA, to bring such suits: the Comptroller
General. However, President Reagan has suggested that the Comptroller General
may not bring suit under the ICA either, for constitutional reasons.41
4. Successful Suits Forcing Release of Impounded Funds
When executive impoundment of funds occurs, it is possible to force release
of impounded funds, through the courts, without relying on the ICA. Thus,
frustrated potential recipients of funds, who lack standing under the ICA, may
still, under certain circumstances, be able to force release of impounded funds,
by relying on the specific authorization or appropriation statutes themselves.
In National Association of Counties v. Baker,42 for example, plaintiffs43
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to force the executive branch to release
funds that Congress had appropriated under the State and Local Government
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972" but that the executive branch subsequently
had sequestered under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act
of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman).45 The court required the disbursement of the funds,
but did not once mention the ICA. The court evaluated the specific language
and legislative intent of the appropriate authorization statutes and Gramm-
Rudman and found that the defendant had improperly refused to release the
funds. The court wrote that the executive "can refuse to expend funds appropri-
ated by Congress only where spending discretion has been expressly conferred
by Congress itself-in the provisions establishing a given program, in the
40. Id. at 827-28. Similarly, in Rocky Ford Housing Authority v. United States Department of
Agriculture, 427 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977), the district court considered whether individuals could bring
a claim in situations where the executive had failed to report an impoundment to Congress. The court ruled
that Congress did not intend for the ICA to create a private right of action in such cases, but that the
Comptroller General, with the tacit approval of Congress, could bring such suits. Id. at 134.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
42. 669 F. Supp. 518 (D.D.C. 1987).
43. The National Association of Counties, National League of Cities, United States Conference of
Mayors, and ten individual cities and counties were plaintiffs. Id. at 519.
44. Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919 (1972), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 14001(a)(1), 100 Stat.
327 (1986).
45. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 &
42 U.S.C.).
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relevant spending statutes, or in some other provision of law."
One court has interpreted the first section of the ICA, which reads in
relevant part, "Nothing contained in this Act, or in any amendments made by
this Act, shall be construed as... superseding any provision of law which
requires the obligation of budget authority or the making of outlays thereun-
der."47 In Dabney v. Reagan,4 a collection of individuals, cities, states, pub-
lic interest groups and members of Congress brought suit against the executive
branch seeking the release of funds from the Solar Energy and Energy Conser-
vation Bank. President Reagan submitted a formal rescission proposal to
Congress, but Congress did not act on it within the statutorily required forty-
five days.
The court, in requiring the expeditious release of the funds, ruled that,
because there was no deferral or rescission message pending under the ICA at
the time of the suit, it was not necessary to determine whether the ICA applied
to the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Bank Act.49
Thus, while two courts have found that frustrated potential recipients of
funds do not have standing under the ICA, 0 other courts continue to find
standing in suits brought outside the ICA to challenge impoundment. Such
courts have granted standing to sue to enforce a specific authorization statute.
5. Executive-Congressional Interaction Under the ICA
The executive branch has two responsibilities under the ICA. First, the
executive must transmit a special message to Congress whenever it proposes
to rescind or defer funding.51 Second, it may only execute the proposed im-
poundment if the conditions of the ICA (and any other statutory provision
appropriate for that particular impoundment) are met.
The Comptroller General has found few situations since passage of the ICA
where the executive branch has not reported an impoundment.52 In addition,
46. 669 F. Supp. at 523. The court cited Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44-48 (1975); City
of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987); and State Highway Commission of Missouri
v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973), for this assertion.
47. 2 U.S.C. § 681 (1988).
48. 542 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
49. In a footnote, however, the court wrote that, because the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation
Bank Act mandated that funds be made available during FY 1982, there was "authority for the proposition
thae' the Impoundment Control Act could not operate to affect that result. Id. at 767 n.3 (citing Maine v.
Goldschmidt, 494 F. Supp. 93 (D. Me. 1980)).
50. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
51. Theoretically, the executive could try to circumvent the reporting requirement in two ways. First,
the executive could simply not report the rescission or deferral. Second, the executive could misclassify
the impoundment, by calling a rescission a deferral or vies versa.
52. From the effective date of the ICA to March 20, 1986, the executive branch reported 1277 deferrals
and proposed 798 rescissions. The Comptroller General identified fifteen additional unreported deferrals
and six additional unreported rescissions, or 1.2% and 0.7% of total deferrals and rescissions, respectively.
See The Deferral Process as Provided by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Rules, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1986) (statement of Milton 3.
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the Comptroller General has not had to reclassify deferrals as rescissions or vice
versa with any degree of regularity.53
With respect to the release of deferred funds, a Special Assistant to the
Comptroller General has testified that the Comptroller General's "monitoring
experience and a review of the record indicate no pattern or practice of refusal
or failure to release deferred funds in a timely manner.' '"
The number and amount of rescissions proposed and the congressional
disapproval rates have varied considerably since the passage of the ICA. The
statistics follow, with amounts in millions of dollars:5"
Rescissions Rescissions Percent
Proposed Rejected Disapproved
Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount
Ford: 154 $8,579 97 $6,078 63% 71%
Carter. 132 $6,746 38 $2,078 29% 31%
Reagan (first two years): 165 $23,269 54 $7,016 33% 30%
Reagan (last six years): 430 $20,011 325 $19,611 76% 98%
Not surprisingly, the proposal and rejection rate of rescissions is primarily
a function of whether the Presidency and Congress are controlled by the same
political party. When the Congress and President shared the same party affilia-
tion during the Carter years, the average number of rescissions proposed each
year was lower, as was the congressional rejection rate. During the early years
of the Reagan presidency, the congressional rejection rate was nearly the same
as during the Carter years, presumably because of the perceived Reagan
mandate and the Republican control of the Senate. However, for the remainder
of the Reagan Presidency, Congress rejected over ninety percent of the dollar
amount of proposed rescissions each year.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE USE OF THE ICA AS A TOOL FOR ENFORCING THE
PRINCIPLE OF APPROPRIATION EXPENDITURE
While the ICA appears to have been effective thus far in curbing the abuses
of impoundment that occurred during the Nixon Administration, some commen-
tators suggest it limits who has standing in the courts to enforce the Principle
of Appropriation Expenditure. Other commentators suggest the ICA should be
amended to give the President greater impoundment power.
Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General).
53. From the effective date of the ICA to March 20, 1986, the Comptroller General reclassified eight
deferrals as rescissions (seven of these were in the first year following passage of the ICA) and reclassified
one rescission proposal as a deferral. Id. at 146.
54. Id. at 138.
55. V. McMuRTY, REsCIsSIoNs BY THE PRESIDENT SINCE 1974: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE 10 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 89-271GOV, 1989).
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This Part briefly outlines the various challenges to the use of the ICA as
a tool for enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure.
A. Standing to Sue Under the ICA
When, in 1987, Congress amended the ICA to remove the legislative veto
for deferrals, it included, in section 206(c), language which provided that
"Sections 1015 and 1016 of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 are reaf-
firmed."56 Section 1015 provides for reports by the Comptroller General and
section 1016 provides for suits by the Comptroller General to cause the execu-
tive branch to make budget authority available for obligation.
In his signing statement for the amendments to the ICA, President Reagan
contended that:
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowsher v. Synar 7 ... makes
clear that the Comptroller General cannot be assigned executive authori-
ty by the Congress. In light of this decision, section 206(c) of the joint
resolution, which purports to "reaffirm" the power of the Comptroller
General to sue the Executive branch under the Impoundment Control
Act, is unconstitutional. It is only on the understanding that section
206(c) is clearly severable from the rest of the joint resolution.... that
I am signing the joint resolution with this constitutional defect.58
President Reagan thus denied that the Comptroller General can sue to enforce
the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure.
In addition, as discussed supra in section LB.3., several district courts have
ruled that the provisions of the ICA implicitly bar parties other than the Comp-
troller General from bringing suit under the ICA to force executive reporting
or release of impounded funds.
If both the Comptroller General and frustrated potential recipients of funds
are barred from bringing suit under the ICA, then the statute has lost virtually
all of its usefulness as a tool for enforcing the Principle of Appropriation
Expenditure.
B. Proposals for Enhanced and Expedited Rescission Authority
As a result of pressures to reduce the deficit, Presidents Reagan and Bush
as well as some members of Congress have sought to increase the President's
impoundment powers. This effort has focused on two proposed changes to the
current impoundment process: enhanced rescission and expedited rescission.
56. Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 206(c), 101 Stat. 785, 786 (1987).
57. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).





Enhanced rescission, in its most extreme form, would allow a rescission
proposed by the President to take effect unless both houses of Congress were
to pass legislation disallowing the rescission and the President were to sign the
legislation. If the President were to veto the legislation, then Congress could
override the veto by a two-thirds vote. Proponents of enhanced rescission argue
that it would give the President greater control over spending, thus providing
an important tool for reducing the federal budget deficit.
A number of bills have been introduced in Congress in recent years to
provide for various forms of enhanced rescission.59 Not surprisingly, most
recent congressional supporters of enhanced rescission authority have been
members of the President's party.'o
Many argue that this form of rescission would give the President a statutory
line-item veto.6" However, enhanced rescission is clearly a more powerful tool
for the executive branch than the line-item veto.62 In addition, enhanced rescis-
sion would require Congress to approve spending three times: (1) at the original
passage of the appropriation; (2) in disapproving the proposed rescission; and
(3) in overriding, by a two-thirds vote, a presidential veto of the disapproval
of the proposed rescission. The existence of these last two "approval steps" puts
the President in a much stronger position and would effectively, and perhaps
unconstitutionally,63 shift control over spending levels from Congress to the
President. Enhanced rescission would largely undermine Congress' control over
federal spending and thus greatly limit its ability to enforce the Principle of
Appropriation Expenditure.
59. V. McMURTRY, supra note 55, at 20-23. These include H.R. 33, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
H.R. 1685, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 401, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); H.R. 808, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1053, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); S. 155, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
60. V. McMURTRY, supra note 55, at 20-23.
61. It has been argued that statutorily providing the President with either a line-item veto or general
impoundment power is unconstitutional because it would strip Congress of its constitutionally assigned
spending power. Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.L 838 (1987). Under this
rationale, enhanced rescission is also unconstitutional.
62. The President's Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs recognized as much when it wrote in a
memorandum to President Reagan:
Enhanced rescission authority could be enacted quickly, builds on existing law, and does
not require the lengthy process for amending the Constitution.
Rescission authority can be exercised at any time and for less than the total budget authority
appropriated for a particular purpose. Most line item veto provisions require vetoing all budget
authority for an item and must be exercised at the time the appropriations bill is presented for
the Chief Executive's signature. In both these senses enhanced rescission authority is a highly
flexible tool for spending control.
V. MCMURTRY, supra note 55, at 15 (citing U.S. Executive Office of the President, Memorandum for the
President from the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs Re: Enhanced Authority to Limit Spending (Dec.
23, 1983)).
63. See supra note 61.
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2. Expedited Rescission
Expedited rescission proposals have two components. First, they would
require Congress to vote "yes" or "no" on the President's proposal, thus insur-
ing that a rescission proposal from the President would not die because of
congressional inaction. Second, they would require Congress to act within a
shorter period of time.' Proponents of expedited rescission argue that Con-
gress has dealt with rescission proposals primarily by inaction, and that expedit-
ed rescission would force Congress to respond to presidential budget concerns
with an up-or-down vote.65
In the 100th and 101st Congresses, a number of bills that provide for
expedited rescission were introduced.66 Such bills typically would require the
President to submit proposed rescissions to Congress within ten or fewer days
after the signing of the appropriations bill. The bills then would require Con-
gress to vote "yes" or "no" on the proposed rescission within a fixed number
of days. One bill, for example, would require Congress to vote on the proposed
rescission within ten calendar days of continuous session.'
Expedited rescission would diminish Congress' control over its own agenda.
In addition, it would force at least one house of Congress to vote twice in
support of funding for a program or purpose (i.e., once in favor of the original
passage of the appropriations bill and once against the rescission proposal).
Expedited rescission would weaken Congress' position in enforcing the Princi-
ple of Appropriation Expenditure and is therefore undesirable.
64. Under current law, Congress has 45 days to complete action on a rescission proposed by the
President, if it wishes the impoundment to occur. 2 U.S.C. §§ 683, 688 (1988).
65. V. MCMURTRY, supra note 55, at 16, 19. Expedited rescission would be part of a class of "fast-
track" procedures that have been instituted in recent years to require Congress to vote up or down on a
particular issue. Such procedures have been established primarily in statutes relating to foreign affairs and
trade. See Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra
Affair, 97 YALE LJ. 1255, 1332 n.358 (1988).
Fast-track procedures do not appear to be unconstitutional under Chadha because they require
"bicameral action and presentment to the President, albeit on an expedited basis." Id.
Finally, "because fast-track procedures are simply statutory modifications in internal house rules, they
are theoretically subject to change at any time by each house." Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ('Each
[house may determine the [r]ules of its [p]roceedings ....").
66. V. McMURTRY, supra note 55, at 23. These include S. CON. RES. 16, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
S. 832, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 2733, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. CON. REs. 45, 101st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); S. CON. REs. 9, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
67. S. CON. REs. 16, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). It is not clear from this or the bills currently




HI. EVALUATING THE CHALLENGES TO STANDING UNDER THE ICA
As seen above,68 President Reagan argued that, under Bowsher v. Synar,
69
the Comptroller General may not sue to enforce the ICA. In addition, courts
have ruled that frustrated potential recipients of funds may not bring suit to
enforce the ICA.
This Part evaluates these challenges to the ICA and argues that (1) the
Comptroller General may sue to enforce the ICA; (2) there is not, under current
law, a private right of action to bring suit under the ICA; and (3) Congress
should amend the ICA to create a private right of action and should expand the
Comptroller General's standing to force the release of impounded funds.
A. Standing for the Comptroller General
In Bowsher, the Court ruled that an officer under the control of Congress
did not have the constitutional authority to execute70 the laws. The question
in the case of the ICA is whether a congressional officer has the constitutional
authority to bring suit, on behalf of Congress, in an Article Ill tribunal.
The Supreme Court has held that it is the role of the legislature to legislate,
not to execute or adjudicate the laws. l What happens, however, when the
executive branch chooses to disenfranchise the legislature by not executing the
laws passed by the legislature? There are two possibilities. First, the legislature
can apply political pressure to force the executive branch to execute the
laws.71 Second, courts have allowed individual members of Congress, a House
of Congress, and agents of the Congress to bring suit when, by the executive
branch's action or inaction, the effect of a law passed by Congress has been
nullified. This option avoids the disadvantages of a purely political resolution
(or no resolution at all) in cases where the executive refuses to carry out a law.
Such suits are not unconstitutional under Bowsher. Congress is not attempt-
ing to execute the laws either itself or through its agent, as was the case in
Bowsher. Rather, Congress is merely bringing a lawsuit, through its agent, to
68. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
69. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
70. The Court did not explicitly define "execute", but noted that "interpreting a law enacted by
Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law." Id. at 733.
71. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,721-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
72. Clearly, this is done in many circumstances. But this solution places the executive branch at an
unfair advantage. Once all the negotiations have been completed on a particular bill or series of bills and
a deal has been struck, the executive can then, perhaps months or years later, threaten not to execute the
law unless Congress makes a new set of concessions on another issue. Alternatively, the executive can
simply refuse to execute the law altogether. These actions may, of course, reduce the executive's credibility
with Congress. Thus, such a ploy on the part of the executive would be most effective as part of an endgame
(e.g., at the end of a President's term).
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try to force the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed. '
The District of Columbia Circuit has articulated a number of different stan-
dards for whether individual members of Congress have standing to sue, some-
times allowing standing and sometimes not.74 While one court has noted, "[ilt
is somewhat difficult to reconcile the various cases on congressional standing
in [the District of Columbia] Circuit,"' the thread running through all of these
decisions is a concern by the courts that they not interfere in situations where
a political remedy is possible or where one disgruntled legislator seeks to win
a political battle through the courts that has been lost in the legislative chamber.
As defined in the ICA, the use of the Comptroller General to enforce the
Principle of Appropriation Expenditure is a mechanism that meets the different
standing requirements developed by each court in this line of congressional
standing cases. The Comptroller General serves as the agent of the entire Con-
gress, as an institution, not of a disgruntled member or group of members who
lost an intramural political battle.76 The Comptroller General must provide
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Implicitly, then, when Congress brings a lawsuit to regain control from
the executive branch over its own lawmaking power, Congress is not engaging in the type of executive
function that Bowsher prohibits. Such lawsuits are, in fact, a constitutional necessity: they enable Congress
to maintain control over its lawmaking role.
74. In Kennedy v. Sampson, for example, the court recognized the standing of Senator Kennedy to
challenge the constitutionality of a pocket veto on the ground that, if unconstitutional, the veto deprived
the Senator of his vote. 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, in Harrington v. Bush, the District
of Columbia Circuit ruled that the plaintiff Congressman did not have standing to bring suit, because the
court did not find injury-in-fact to the plaintiff himself. 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
In Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, the District of Columbia Circuit developed a doctrine
of "equitable discretion" for members of Congress who seek relief in court. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). This doctrine provided that "[w]hen a congressional plaintiff brings a suit
involving circumstances in which legislative redress is not available or a private plaintiff would likely not
qualify for standing, the court would be counseled... to hear the case." Id. at 882. The court then dismissed
the case, because judicial action would have interfered with the legislative process, which offered the
potential for legislative redress. Significantly, however, the court did write, "such actions as impeachment,
expulsion proceedings, impoundment, and certain acts of the executive not subject to direct legislative redress
or private party challenge... would be subject to judicial review in a congressional plaintiff case." Id.
(emphasis added).
In Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987), the court again found sufficient grounds to grant standing to thirty-three individual members
of the House of Representatives and for the Senate as an institutional body to challenge a pocket veto. The
court did not, however, apply the doctrine of equitable discretion.
See generally Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing different, conflicting standards used by courts and concluding that Congress,
as an institution, possesses standing, while individual members generally do not).
75. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom., Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986).
76. In Kennedy, the executive branch was willing to acknowledge the standing of either house of
Congress, as an institution, to sue in order to preserve the congressional role in the lawmaking process. 511
F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Appellants' Reply Br. at 2). In Barnes, the court explicitly granted
standing to the United States Senate, citing Kennedy. 759 F2d at 25-26. Thus the use of the Comptroller
General, to sue on behalf of the Congress as a whole, in order to enforce a law that has won the support
of both houses of Congress, is consistent with the District of Columbia Circuit's decisions on standing.
Suits brought by the Comptroller General are not barred by the "political question" doctrine. See Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
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impoundment reports to both houses of Congress and may not file suit until
twenty-five calendar days after notifying legislative leaders of her intent to file
suit." This provision presumably gives the legislative leaders time to work
out political compromises with the executive branch and determine whether
they want to bring suit.
Thus, contrary to the assertion made by President Reagan in his signing
statement for the amendments to the ICA. 8 the Comptroller General should
be able to sue the executive branch under the ICA. The Comptroller General
does not assume executive authority, but rather is acting as an agent for the
Congress, as an institution. As such, the Comptroller General is bringing suit
under those conditions where courts have found congressional standing to be
constitutional.
79
B. Standing for Frustrated Potential Recipients of Funds
The court in Public Citizen v. Stockman8 found that "Congress did not
intend to create a private right of action to police against transgressions of the
[ICA] by the executive."81 Citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis,82 the court noted that the most important question to be answered in
determining whether a private right of action exists is whether it was the intent
of Congress to create a private remedy for violation of a particular statute.8 3
The court then went on to find that there was nothing in the language or
legislative history of the ICA indicating that Congress intended to create a
private right of action.84
The court was correct, both in its interpretation of the case law relating to
a private right of action 5 and in its interpretation of legislative intent behind
the ICA. As is clear from Transamerica, congressional intent is a key factor
in determining whether a particular statute has created a private right of action.
There is no convincing evidence in either the text of the ICA itself or in its
legislative history to support the contention that Congress intended to create
authority has been committed... is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion."). The "political question" doctrine, which applies in cases where the courts should not intrude into
legislative or executive decisionmaking, does not apply when one branch of government has exceeded its
constitutional authority at the expense of another branch (e.g., when the President impounds without
congressional approval).
77. See supra note 31.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
79. The Comptroller General is also authorized to bring a civil action to require the head of an
executive agency to provide access for the Comptroller General to agency records relating to the "duties,
powers, activities, organization, and financial transactions of the agency." 31 U.S.C. § 716(a) & (b) (1988).
80. 528 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1981).
81. Id. at 827.
82. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
83. Stockman, 528 F. Supp. at 827.
84. Id. at 828-30.
85. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-80 (1974).
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a private right of action under the ICA.86 Thus private parties may not bring
suit under the ICA.
C. Toward an Expansion of Standing
This section examines the tools that are available for controlling executive
impoundments under current law. It also argues that Congress should amend
the ICA to make more tools available to enforce the Principle of Appropriation
Expenditure.
1. Impoundments that Do Not Fall Under the ICA
As discussed above, there have been suits which were brought prior to
passage of the ICA and some which were brought after passage of the ICA,
where the plaintiffs did not rely on a violation of the ICA as a basis for their
suit. Train (suit brought by municipalities in the State of New York), Volpe
(suit brought by Missouri, with amicus curiae brief filed by twenty-seven
members of Congress), and National Association of Counties v. Baker (suit
brought by associations of counties, cities and mayors and ten individual cities
and counties) were all brought by potential recipients of funds.
No case has clearly held that members of Congress or a congressional agent
can sue for release of funds based solely on the terms of an authorization
statute (i.e., in cases where the ICA does not apply). In Dabney v. Reagan,'
members of Congress, individuals, cities and public interest groups brought suit
against members of the executive branch. The court did not rule on whether
the members of Congress had standing, but did write, "I am satisfied.., that
someone in the plaintiffs' ranks has the requisite standing.""8
It may or may not be appropriate for a single member of Congress or group
of members of Congress to bring suit to force release of impounded funds.89
However it is appropriate for an agent of Congress, as a body, to bring suit to
force release of impounded funds, even in those cases that fall outside the ICA.
For this reason, Congress should amend the ICA to make clear that the Comp-
troller General may bring suit to force release of impounded funds not just in
cases that fall within the ICA, but also in those not covered by the ICA.
86. See Stockaan, 528 F. Supp. at 827-30. But see Mills & Munselle, supra note 6, at 24 EMORY L.
313, 339-41 (1975) (arguing that under certain circumstances private parties and states do have standing
to sue under ICA).
87. 542 F. Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
88. Id. at 763.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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2. Impoundments that Fall Under the ICA
Although such a case has never actually been decided, this Note has ar-
gued9° that authorizing the Comptroller General to bring suit under the ICA
is a statutorily and constitutionally valid tool for enforcing the Principle of
Appropriation Expenditure. However, under the rationale of Public Citizen v.
Stockman,9 private parties currently may not bring suit under the ICA. Con-
gress should amend the ICA to allow private suits to be brought to require the
release of funds incorrectly impounded under the ICA.
Two courts in the post-ICA era have allowed private suits to force the
release of impounded funds.92 However in each case, the court found that the
President was not subject to the structure of the ICA. In one case, National
Association of Counties v. Baker,93 the issue presented was the interpretation
of the Gramm-Rudman Act. In the other case, Dabney v. Reagan,' the court
noted that the ICA did not apply to the appropriations in question because the
authorizing act made the appropriations mandatory.95
But what happens when the President uses the structure set up in the ICA
(e.g., submitting a rescission message to Congress) and then impounds illegally,
by withholding funds, despite the lack of a vote by Congress in favor of a
rescission bill? By amending the ICA, Congress should allow private parties
who are frustrated potential recipients of funds to sue under such circumstances.
Such an amendment would be valuable in enforcing the Principle of Appro-
priation Expenditure, because once Congress has authorized and appropriated
funding for a program, potential recipients of funds have a strong interest in
insuring that funding is made available. The leadership of Congress, with whom
the Comptroller General would presumably consult in deciding whether to bring
a suit, may not have the same direct interest in making funds available.
The court in Public Citizen v. Stockman argued that by allowing a private
right of action under the ICA, "Congress would be stripped of its primary
control over the resolution of executive-legislative budgetary disputes.
' 96
There are two responses to this argument. First, Congress still maintains
primary control. If Congress wishes that appropriated funds be impounded for
any reason, it simply needs to pass a bill rescinding or deferring the funding.
Second, once an appropriation bill has become law, it is not clear why the
leadership of Congress should be able to acquiesce in negating an appropriation
90. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
91. 528 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1981).
92. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
93. 669 F. Supp. 518 (D.D.C. 1987).
94. 542 F. Supp. 756 ($.D.N.Y. 1982).
95. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
96. Stockman, 528 F. Supp. at 830.
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that was passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.
Without a private right of action, the congressional leadership can do just that.
In summary, Congress should amend the ICA to (1) allow the Comptroller
General to act as the agent for Congress in bringing suit to force release of
impounded funds in situations not covered by the ICA and (2) allow a private
right of action in bringing suits under the ICA.
CONCLUSION
From the presidency of Thomas Jefferson until the Nixon Administration,
presidential impoundments were generally resolved through political channels.
President Nixon tried to change the rules of the impoundment game, by ignor-
ing political pressure and claiming that he possessed a constitutional and
statutory right to impound. This led to two types of response. First, frustrated
potential recipients of funds brought suit to force release of impounded funds,
based upon statutory interpretations of the particular budget authorization bills
and the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure. Second, Congress passed the
ICA, which was intended to reassert congressional control over the budget.
However, if various commentators (including President Reagan, the courts
and academics) are correct, the current version of the ICA is a toothless act
because (1) the Comptroller General may not sue to enforce the ICA and (2)
private rights of action are not permitted under the ICA.
This Note has argued that the commentators are incorrect in the first asser-
tion and correct in the second. The Comptroller General, as an agent of Con-
gress, may sue to enforce the ICA. But the law, as currently written, does not
allow for private rights of action. Congress should amend the ICA in order to
ensure more fully that the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure will be
upheld. Specifically, Congress should provide for a private right of action under
the ICA and should expand the Comptroller General's role to include bringing
suit to force release of impounded funds not covered by the ICA. By doing so,
Congress will have put in place the tools for best enforcing the Principle of
Appropriation Expenditure. Furthermore, Congress should reject calls for
enhanced and expedited rescission. Enhanced rescission gives the President far
greater discretion to determine spending than a line-item veto and would greatly
limit Congress' power to enforce the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure.
Expedited rescission, while less extreme than enhanced rescission, would also
diminish Congress' control over the budget by forcing at least one house to
vote a second time in favor of funding a given initiative.
The Impoundment Control Act was a valuable first step in providing for
better enforcement of the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure. By amending
the ICA, as recommended in this Note, and defeating proposals for enhanced
and expedited rescission, Congress can insure that the President does not violate
the principle of separation of powers by expropriating the power of the purse.
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